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Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, The Blame Game, 
and the Hazards of Hindsight 
 
Thomas O. McGarity and Douglas A. Kysar 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“There are only two kinds of levees, those that have failed and those that 
will fail.”1 
 
 The failure of the New Orleans levees to prevent waters from Lake Pontchartrain, 
Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico from flooding the city during Hurricane Katrina led 
to one of the worst disasters in this country’s history.  Although many other causes for 
the human suffering and economic loss that followed in the wake of Katrina have been 
identified and debated, no one disputes the causal connection between the flooding and 
the failure of the levees.  Had the levees been differently designed, constructed, and/or 
maintained, the flooding would not have occurred.  The critical question of why the 
levees failed, however, has generated considerable disagreement.  Although the casual 
observer might assume that this is a primarily a question for engineering experts, a 
complete answer may also require a careful reconstruction of the planning history of the 
levee system and of the role that federal budgetary policy, environmental litigation, and 
other public policy developments played in the system’s complex evolution.   
 In the heated political aftermath of Katrina, the analysis has been further 
complicated by the perhaps unavoidable tendency of participants in public policy debates 
to conflate causation with fault and to play the “blame game.”  Prominently featured in 
Katrina’s immediate political aftermath was the claim that the levee system would have 
protected New Orleans had local fishermen and an environmental group not filed a 
lawsuit in the late 1970s under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2  In 
particular, critics argue that because a federal district court responded to this suit by 
enjoining the levee project pending the preparation of an adequate environmental impact 
statement (EIS), the United States Army Corps of Engineers ultimately abandoned its 
original design for the New Orleans levees and adopted instead an alternative design that 
is said to have been less capable of protecting the city from the storm surge created by 
Katrina.  In other words, some commentators contend that, as a result of the lawsuit, the 
Corps redesigned the project in a way that failed to protect the city.   
 This Article will evaluate the claim that the 1970s environmental lawsuit 
caused—in any meaningful sense—the destruction of New Orleans in 2005.  Although 
correct answers to many engineering questions are critical to this analysis, the Article will 
not attempt to resolve those technical questions.  It will rely instead on preliminary 
reports produced by various groups of engineers that have analyzed the failures of 
particular levees.  The Article will also avoid to the extent possible other socio-political 
                                                 
1 Ass’n State Floodplain Managers, Hurricane Katrina & Rita: Using Mitigation to Rebuild a 
Safer Gulf Coast, Sept. 9, 2005 (reporting common saying among U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, et seq. 
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explanations for the levee failures that were featured in the post-Katrina blame game, 
such as the failure of the current and past Administrations to request sufficient 
appropriations to build and maintain levees and the role played by alleged 
mismanagement within the special New Orleans levee districts.3  Focusing exclusively on 
the environmental lawsuit claim, this Article will attempt to probe at a deeper level the 
difficulty of retrospective analysis in the hope that the discussion might prove helpful to 
those who are examining not only the levee failures, but those other potentially 
contributing causes as well.  Just as the “lawsuit that drowned New Orleans” turns out to 
be oversimplified and misleading, other attempts to pin responsibility for the Katrina 
levee failure on any single act or omission are likely to obscure the broader lessons of the 
tragedy.   
 In that respect, scrutinizing the role of the NEPA lawsuit in Katrina levee failures 
also sheds some important light on the challenges facing government disaster policy from 
the forward-looking perspective.  The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that 
confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster 
also confound the attempt to predict through foresight the variety of outcomes, including 
potentially disastrous ones, which may flow from policy choices.  Thus, in order to guard 
against catastrophic potentialities in the future—whether of economic, environmental, or 
human loss—one must keep firmly in mind not only the hazards of hindsight, but also the 
foibles of foresight.  
 The next Part of this Article provides both a detailed historical reconstruction of 
the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system—
including the relevant litigation brought against the Corps of Engineers by various local 
interests including the environmental action group Save Our Wetlands4—and an analysis 
of how and why Katrina overcame that system.  Part III then uses tort law’s “but for” 
causation doctrine to introduce the blame game that has been played post-Katrina by 
policy-makers, politicians, and various others.  Part IV considers in depth the 
counterfactual scenario of the New Orleans levee planning absent the NEPA lawsuit in 
order to construct a hindsight analysis if the likely causal  role played by Save Our 
Wetlands in the flooding of New Orleans.  Lessons about forecasting risk and 
appropriately preparing for future calamities are drawn from the foregoing analysis in 
Part V.  Concluding thoughts are offered in Part VI. 
 
II. History of the Levee System 
 
 Because New Orleans is situated in the delta formed at the mouth of the 
Mississippi River, it has long maintained a flood control system to protect it from the 
risks of flooding from the Mississippi River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, this issue (observing numerous pre-Katrina warnings of the inadequacy 
of the existing storm surge protection system and noting that “[n]otwithstanding these warnings, federal 
funding of the New Orleans’ levees dropped by 50% over the past four years”); Andrew Martin & Andrew 
Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, Chicago Tribune, September 1, 2005, at 7. 
4 Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. No. 75-3710, Slip Opinion (E.D. La. 1977). 
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and Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico to the east.5  The levee system that surrounded 
New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provided by far the most sophisticated and 
powerful protection in the city’s long history.  Katrina demonstrated, however, that an 
even more sophisticated and powerful flooding and storm surge protection system will be 
needed to protect the city in the future.  In particular, because of its unique topographical 
setting, the City of New Orleans will always be at risk from a catastrophic failure of the 
levee systems that have grown up around it, if levees are to remain the city’s primary 
form of defense.  Indeed, the risk will only increase as the city continues to subside and 
the protective wetlands between it and the Gulf of Mexico continue to diminish.6 
In addition to its Gulf storm surge protection projects, the Corps of Engineers also 
designed and constructed the levee system that protects New Orleans from periodic 
Mississippi River flooding that typically occurs during springtime.  The risk of flooding 
from the Mississippi River stems largely from flood waters moving down the river as a 
result of rainfall events that may take place hundreds of miles to the north of the city.  
The primary line of defense against river flooding is an extensive system of levees and 
dikes that extends along the length of the river as it flows through Louisiana.  That 
system, which contains the city’s highest levees, averaging 25 feet above sea level in 
height, was not involved in the Hurricane Katrina disaster.7  Although one misinformed 
participant in the blame game following the Katrina disaster erroneously attributed the 
New Orleans flooding to an environmental lawsuit involving the Mississippi River levees 
(200 miles upstream, no less),8 most of the critical attention to environmental litigation in 
the wake of Katrina has focused instead on the levee system that protects New Orleans 
from sea storm surge.  Unlike the Mississippi River flood protection system, those levees 
did not perform during Katrina as they were designed to do.  Accordingly, the discussion 
hereafter will focus exclusively on the levees, rather than the Mississippi River flood 
protection system.   
 Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne are located side-by-side to the north and 
northeast of the city and are separated by a narrow strip of land that allows water to flow 
between the lakes through two narrow passes northeast of the city at the Rigolets and 
Chef Menteur (see figure 1).9  While Lake Borgne is separated from developed areas of 
the city by a large area of open swampland, Lake Pontchartrain immediately borders the 
downtown and western parts of the city.10  The primary flood risk from the lakes occurs 
in the late summer and fall during tropical storms and hurricanes.  Surges in Lake 
Pontchartrain pose the greatest risk to the downtown area, and surges in Lake Borgne 
primarily threaten New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish to the east of the downtown 
area.  An interconnected series of levees protects the city from storm surges in the lakes.  
                                                 
5 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-2; Mark Fischetti, Drowning New 
Orleans, Scientific American, October 1, 2001. 
6 Fischetti, supra note ___, at [page]. 
7 Bob Marshall, Levee System Along River Held Its Ground in Storm, Times-Picayune, Jan. 23, 
2006. 
8 R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Eco-Catastrophe Echoes, Washington Times, September 16, 2005 
9 A map of the lakes and levees prepared by the New Orleans Times-Picayune staff can be found 
at http://www.nola.com/hurricane/popup/nolalevees_jpg.html. 
10 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-2. 
 4
These levees are considerably smaller than the ones that line the Mississippi River, 
ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height. 
  
 
 
 Because much of the land mass of New Orleans is below sea level and continues 
to sink, rainwater that flows into the city must be removed not by natural drainage, but by 
huge pumps that force the water to move northward along three man-made canals, called 
“outfall” or “drainage” canals, into Lake Pontchartrain.  Named for the streets that they 
parallel (17th Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue), the canals are lined with 
levees and concrete floodwalls that prevent the water from spilling into the city.11  In 
some places, water flowing through the canals is nearly as high as the rooftops of houses 
in the surrounding neighborhoods.12  All of the levees were built by contractors working 
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and, like all of the levees protecting the city, are 
maintained by various local levee districts.13 
 In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps of Engineers during the twentieth 
century constructed three large and interconnected “navigation” canals to permit ocean-
                                                 
11 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-1. 
12 First Line of Defense: Hoping the Levees Hold, available at 
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/popup/nolalevees_jpg.html. 
13 Id. 
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going vessels to move from the Mississippi River through the city north to Lake 
Pontchartrain, northeast to the Intercoastal Waterway that connects ports along the entire 
Gulf Coast, and south to the Gulf of Mexico.  The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (often 
referred to by the local population as the “Industrial Canal”) slices north/south across the 
city between the river and Lake Pontchartrain at the point where they are closest to each 
other.  The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects the Industrial Canal at 
right angles and travels east/west to a point in St. Bernard Parish where it forms a “Y” 
with the Intercoastal Waterway.  From the Y, the Intercoastal Waterway moves to the 
northeast and the MRGO Canal continues in a southeasterly direction to the Gulf of 
Mexico.14  Like the outfall canals, the shipping canals are all confined by earthen levees 
and concrete floodwalls. 
 The levee systems effectively divide the city and surrounding developed areas 
into four large protected basins called “polders,” each of which is protected by its own 
perimeter levee system.15  Thus, the land within one polder can flood while the land 
remaining within other polders remains protected.  In the devastating Katrina flood, 
however, levees in all of the polders failed, and some or all of the land within each was 
flooded.  Land located in the crescent bordering the Mississippi River at the south end of 
the downtown area is above sea level and therefore was not flooded.   
 
A. Levee Planning and Construction History 
  
 The system just described grew out of a reevaluation of the protections that had 
failed when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in September 1965.  Reacting to the 
devastating flooding which resulted from that storm, Congress authorized a massive 
hurricane protection improvement effort called the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 
Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) to provide hurricane protection to all of the 
Greater New Orleans metropolitan area.16  To implement this statute, the Corps of 
Engineers carefully studied two major options—the “high level” option and the “barrier” 
option.   
 
1. The “High Level” and “Barrier” Options. 
 
 The “high level” option consisted simply of raising all of the existing levees and, 
where necessary, constructing new levees to a height that would prevent flooding that 
could result from the standard project hurricane (SPH), a hypothetical hurricane that was 
used to guide Corps levee design and that loosely represented the most extreme hurricane 
                                                 
14 John Schwartz, Competing Plans to Repair New Orleans Flood Protection, New York Times, 
January 22, 2006, at A18. 
15 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-3.  The word “polder” is a Dutch word 
that means “a contiguous land unit protected by a perimeter levee system.”  Id. 
16 Hearings on Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity before the 
Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings], at 20 (testimony of Colonel Early J. 
Rush III).  See also GAO, Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, at 4. 
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that would be expected to hit New Orleans every 200 to 300 years.17  Although experts 
later determined that the model hurricane could not possibly occur in the real world,18 it 
was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three storm on the Saffir-Simpson 
hurricane scale.19  In practice, the high level plan for protection against the SPH would 
have resulted in raising the levees from between 9.3 and 13.5 feet above sea level to 
between 16 and 18.5 feet above sea level.20  The assumption was, of course, that the 
levees would be properly designed and constructed to withstand all storm surges that did 
not exceed those levels. 
 Under the “barrier” option, the Corps would have constructed levees along the far 
eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain where it flows into Lake Borgne and ultimately the 
Gulf of Mexico through two relatively narrow channels at the Rigolets pass and Chef 
Menteur pass (see figure 2).  The Corps would also have constructed structures at the two 
passes containing massive gates that would have allowed water to flow back and forth 
between the lakes but that would have been closed when hurricanes approached.21  
Finally, the Corps would have built a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control 
structure at the point at which the Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain.  The gates 
would have been closed during hurricanes to prevent water from entering the Industrial 
Canal from Lake Pontchartrain.22  The Corps believed that the levees and the barrier 
structure would prevent storm surge preceding hurricanes from crossing from Lake 
Bourne into Lake Pontchartrain.23  Consequently, the levees bordering the city along 
Lake Pontchartrain would be fortified, but not significantly raised as under the alternative 
plan.  Still, like the high level option, the barrier option was designed to protect against 
the SPH.24 
 
2. First Choice: The Barrier Option 
 
 The high level option had several drawbacks from the perspective of Corps 
officials, including the need to obtain rights of way for additional land near the levees to 
allow them to be widened and raised.  In addition, the high level plan would not have 
prevented the flooding of some industrial areas and potentially developable wetlands 
                                                 
17 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 21 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III).  For an extended 
discussion of the SPH, see infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
18 John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a Greater Threat 
from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected, Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002 (“Meteorologists today say the 
Standard Project Hurricane could not exist in nature.”) (quoting Louisiana State University engineering 
professor Joseph Suhayda). 
19 Jerry Mitchell, E-Mail Suggests Government Seeking to Blame Groups, Mississippi Clarion-
Ledger, September 16, 2005, at A1 (quoting Corps of Engineers spokesperson John Hall); John McQuaid 
& Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002, at J12; See 
Government Accountability Office, Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee Maintenance and 
Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, GAO-06-322T, at page 1. 
20 United States General Accounting Office, Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems of the 
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (PSAD-76-161 (August 31, 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as 1976 GAO Report], at 3. 
21 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22-24, 33-36 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III). 
22 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22-24, 33-36 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III). 
23 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III). 
24 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III). 
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located outside the existing downtown polder between the levees and the lake to the 
northeast of the city.25  The Corps therefore decided to implement the barrier option.26  
To speed the project along, the Orleans Levee Board financed and constructed portions of 
the Industrial Canal floodwalls, and this relatively inexpensive aspect of the project was 
virtually completed by 1973.27   Work on the barrier structures and levees running from 
New Orleans to the those structures, however, was greatly delayed because landowners 
opposed to the project demanded high prices for parcels of property that the Corps 
needed in order to construct the levees, forcing the Corps to exercise its power of eminent 
domain.28 
 In 1976, a coalition of local fishermen and an environmental group called Save 
Our Wetlands sued the Corps of Engineers alleging that the final environmental impact 
statement (FEIS) prepared for the project was inadequate.29  On December 30, 1977, a 
federal district court agreed, issuing an injunction that prevented the Corps from 
conducting any further work on the barrier project until it had prepared an adequate FEIS.  
The injunction was subsequently modified to permit continued construction of the levees 
between the lake and the City of New Orleans.30 
                                                 
25 Id. at 21 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III). 
26 The Orleans Levee District -- A History, available at http://www/orleanslevee.com/history.htm 
[hereinafter cited as Levee District History] 
27 Id. 
28 1976 GAO Report, supra, at 16. 
29 Levee District History. 
30 Id. 
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3. Second Choice: The High Level Plan 
 
 After the injunction issued, the Corps reconsidered the costs and benefits of the 
barrier and high level options.  It was at that time encountering additional opposition to 
the barrier plan from local citizens who did not want to pay a very high price for a project 
that might endanger the vitality of Lake Pontchartrain,31 from citizens who saw the 
project as “a land grab that would personally enrich some of the civic leaders pushing 
hardest for it,”32 and from representatives of areas on the Lake Borgne side of the barrier 
who likely would have been placed at greater risk of flooding during hurricanes and who 
therefore felt the plan would foreclose economic development of their region.33 
 The intense public opposition was in evidence during congressional hearings 
conducted in New Orleans the week after the injunction issued.  A spokesperson for the 
League of Women Voters argued that the Corps had never undertaken a study of the cost 
to taxpayers of maintaining the urbanization of wetlands that the project envisioned, and 
she noted that the voters of New Orleans had defeated proposals to participate in 
financing the barrier project on three separate occasions, but had voted to approve a 
                                                 
31 United States General Accounting Office, Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems of the 
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (PSAD-76-161 (August 31, 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as 1976 GAO Report], at 3. 
32 Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, National Journal, September 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907. 
33 Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, National Journal, September 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907. 
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similar project without the barriers the previous year.34  An informal poll conducted by 
Representative Robert Livingston indicated that a substantial majority of the New 
Orleans citizens either opposed the project (38.5 percent) or favored discontinuation until 
the studies could be completed (23.6 percent).35  Although not known for his antipathy to 
federally financed public works projects in his district, even Representative Livingston 
expressed considerable reservations about the wisdom of this particular project.  The state 
representative from St. Tammany Parish, part of which was on the Lake Borgne side of 
the barrier project, warned that the project would put his parish at risk when the gates 
were closed because it would deflect the surge from Lake Borgne into St. Tammany 
Parish.36 
 By 1982, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers had changed its 
mind.  It now favored the high level plan “because it would cost less than the barrier 
plan” and would “have fewer detrimental effects on Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.”37  
One of the factors underlying the changed cost assessment was no doubt the escalating 
cost of acquiring rights of way from property owners who opposed the barrier project.38  
The Corps made a final decision to proceed ahead with the high level plan in 1985.  
Although nearly seven years had passed between the issuance of the injunction and the 
Corps’ ultimate decision to abandon the barrier plan, the project was substantially 
completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.39 
 
B. The Levee Failures 
 
 Although the explanation for why the New Orleans levees failed involves a 
complex interaction of engineering and policy considerations, the inquiry into what 
physically happened to the levees on August 29, 2005 is largely a technical question.  
This is not, however, to say that there is an easy explanation for what exactly happened to 
the levees that night, and the engineers studying that question will no doubt debate the 
finer points of the analysis for years.  The description below draws primarily upon the 
Preliminary Report of a group of experts from the University of California at Berkeley 
and the American Society of Civil Engineers (the “Berkeley/ASCE group”) based upon 
its analysis of the situation shortly after the hurricane.40  The Corps of Engineers, a group 
from the Louisiana State University Hurricane Canter, and a panel assembled by the 
                                                 
34 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 11 (testimony of Charlotte H. Nelson). 
35 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 12. 
36 1978 House Hearings, supra, at 47-48 (testimony of Edward G. Scogin). 
37 United States General Accounting Office, Improved Planning Needed by the Corps of Engineers 
to Resolve Environmental, Technical and Financial Issues on the Lake Pontchartain Hurricane Protection 
Project (GAO/MASAD-82-39 (August 17, 1982), at 2. 
38 1976 GAO Report, supra, at 16. 
39 Levee District History, supra. 
40     R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems 
in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005).  The description also relies on newspaper 
accounts of conclusions of the experts involved in this and other investigations. 
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National Academy of Sciences are also conducting in depth inquiries that could well 
come to different conclusions.41 
 
1. Lake Pontchartrain and the Outfall Canals. 
 
 The water that flooded the polder containing downtown New Orleans and the 
French Quarter did not flow over the high level levees situated between Lake 
Pontchartrain and the city.  As previously discussed, these levees were designed to 
withstand a hurricane that was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three 
Hurricane, and they did their job.  Most of the experts have agreed that by the time it 
encountered Lake Pontchartrain, Katrina’s status had decreased from Category Four to 
the upper range of Category Three.42  As the surge flowed from Lake Pontchartrain up 
the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue and London Avenue outfall canals, it did not overtop the 
levees confining those canals either.43  The surge did, however, cause three major 
breaches in the 17th Street and London Avenue levees.44  These breaches allowed water 
from Lake Pontchartrain to flood wide areas of the downtown polder.  In the aftermath of 
the storm, the Corps of Engineers stressed that the two specific outfall levees that had 
breached were “fully completed” and not on the list of unfunded projects.45  
 The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that the levee failure on the east side of the 
17th Street canal “appears to have been a stability failure of the foundation soils beneath 
the earthen embankment” to which the floodwall was attached.46  The group concluded as 
a preliminary matter that the breach on the west bank of the London Avenue canal 
“occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being pushed backwards by the elevated 
water pressures on the outboard side, and that support on the inboard side of the 
sheetpile/floodwall was reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the 
earthen levee embankment.”47  According to the group’s report “[e]vidence at both sites 
suggests that massive underseepage passed beneath the relatively short sheetpiles, and 
this may have weakened the foundation soils beneath the inboard sides of the earthen 
                                                 
41 For more current information, Boalt Hall School of Law maintains a website of regularly 
updated information on the Katrina disaster and disasters and the law more generally.  See 
http://128.32.29.133/disasters.php. 
42 Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, 
Washington Post, October 24, 2005, at A1 
43 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-5.  See also John M. Barry, After the 
Deluge, Some Questions, New York Times, October 13, 2005 (citing the preliminary conclusions of three 
post-Katrina engineering studies); Celeste Biever, Flood Walls in New Orleans were “Structurally Flawed,” 
New Scientist, September 22, 2005 (quoting Paul Kemp, and oceonologist at the Louisiana State University 
Hurricane Center). 
44 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-5. 
45 Andrew Martin & Andrew Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, Chicago Tribune, 
September 1, 2005, at 7. 
46 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-3. 
47 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-6. 
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levee embankments.”48  In other words, the pressure that the storm surge generated from 
within the canal caused the weak soil in which the floodwalls were anchored to give way 
in some places and pushed the walls backwards into the protected polders. 
 Consistently with this conclusion, most engineers who have examined the 
question have concluded that the underseepage occurred because the floodwalls were not 
anchored sufficiently deeply in the foundation soils at the time that they were designed 
and built in connection with the implementation of the high level option in the late 
1980s.49  The leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group noted that the safety margins employed 
in the designs for the levees were far lower than the safety margins employed in most 
other critical engineering projects.50  The Corps of Engineers has traditionally employed 
a safety factor of 1.3 for levee construction projects, meaning that levees are designed to 
withstand pressure approximately one-third again as powerful as expected forces.51 
 According to documents from the mid-1980s when the high level option was 
being implemented along the outfall canals (accounts of which vary somewhat), tests of 
the soil below the existing levees encountered a layer of peat some 15-20 feet below the 
surface.52  The design for the project called for sinking the pilings 17-20 feet below the 
surface.53  Since peat expands and softens when it becomes wet, the pilings should have 
been extended sufficiently far beneath the peat to provide adequate stability.54  A team of 
experts from Louisiana State University concluded from an examination of historical 
documents that the floodwalls built in the 1980s to implement the high level option were 
not anchored sufficiently deeply because the soils immediately below the existing levees 
consisted of spoil from digging the canals in the late nineteenth century and dredging 
them in the early twentieth century.55  This explanation is consistent with documents filed 
in litigation during the mid-1990s between the Corps of Engineers and a construction 
                                                 
48 R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-6. 
49 Eli Kintisch, Levees Came Up Short, Researchers Tell Congress, 310 Science 953 (2005); Joby 
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company that had been working on the levees.  The company claimed that sections of the 
floodwalls were failing to line up properly because of unstable underlying soils.56  
Although Corps of Engineers officials are not yet persuaded by this explanation, the 
design for rebuilding the floodwalls post-Katrina does call for sinking the pilings to a 
depth of 40 feet.57 
 Other evidence suggests that the contractors who were responsible for testing the 
soil and building the levees along the outfall canals may have been responsible for poor 
construction in places where the levees breached.58  A team of engineers from LSU who 
investigated the levee failures at the behest of the State of Louisiana discovered that the 
piling extended only 10 feet below sea level in some areas, rather than the 17 foot depth 
called for in the design documents.59  Although a Corps of Engineers analysis of the same 
pilings rejected this conclusion,60 the LSU scientists are convinced that their assessment 
is correct because the measuring equipment that they used is more accurate than the 
Corps’ equipment.61   The Berkeley/ASCE group also heard allegations of malfeasance 
on the part of contractors in connection with the construction of the levees and “some 
field evidence” appeared to “correlate with those stories.”62  Berkeley Engineer Robert 
Bea worried that the outside engineering firms and contractors may have been more 
concerned with the bottom line than with identifying and correcting problems in the 
design and construction of the levees.63   Louisiana’s Attorney General has opened an 
investigation into these allegations.64 
 Finally, the Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that lax maintenance practices may 
have contributed to the breach of some of the levees lining the outfall canals.65  For 
example, large trees were allowed to grow at the base of some of the levees.  According 
to one of the engineers conducting the Berkeley/ASCE investigation, the root systems of 
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the trees could have opened up a pathway for water to seep through a soft layer of peat 
beneath the levees and reach the other side, thereby undermining the integrity of the levee 
wall.66  In addition, state and local officials have admitted that they typically skipped the 
canal floodwalls when they were performing annual levee inspections, and that the levees 
they did inspect were given only cursory attention.67  The Corps of Engineers has not yet 
agreed with these assessments, and it has instead undertaken an extensive investigation of 
the causes of the outlet canal levee failures.68  Nevertheless, the information and analysis 
revealed thus far suggests that the outlet canal walls were not overtopped and that the 
downtown polder would not have flooded if the walls had withstood the lateral pressure 
of the storm surge inside the canals, as they were designed to do.69 
 
2. Lake Borgne 
 
 The largest storm surge to hit the New Orleans area came not from Lake 
Pontchartrain to the north but from Lake Borgne to the east.70  Although the Corps 
enhanced the levees for the polders protecting New Orleans East from Lake Borgne as 
part of the high level plan, the estimated 18–25 foot storm surge exceeded the height of 
some of the levees protecting that polder by as much as 5–10 feet.71  These levees were 
simply not high enough to repel the storm surge, and they were “overwhelmed” and 
“massively eroded.”72  Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps’ head engineer for the New 
Orleans district, reported that the eastern levees were “literally leveled in places.”73  
Large areas in this polder, which was inhabited mainly by low income residents and 
businesses that served local communities, were flooded.  Since this surge came from 
Lake Borgne and not Lake Pontchartrain, it is clear that the barrier project—had it been 
constructed during the 1980s—would not have prevented this damage and might even 
have exacerbated it by deflecting some portion of the surge from the two passes to the 
southern half of Lake Borgne.  A protection system more massive in scope that could 
have slowed or prevented a storm surge into Lake Borgne—such as the huge seagate 
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structures that are utilized to protect the Netherlands from North Atlantic storms74—
might in theory have provided better protection to New Orleans.  No such structures, 
however, were contemplated as part of the original barrier plan. 
 
3. The Navigation Canals 
 
 Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge also proceeded from the Gulf of Mexico and 
Lake Borgne up the MRGO Canal to the Industrial Canal in the heart of New Orleans.  
The MRGO Canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep draft seaway channel that 
extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of New Orleans into Breton Sound 
and the Gulf of Mexico.  It was designed to shorten the distance for ships traveling from 
the eastern shipping lanes of the Gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up to its 
economic expectations.75  The storm surge overtopped the levees running along these 
canals at “a number of locations,” and several breaches occurred.76   
A post-Katrina modeling exercise undertaken by the LSU Hurricane Center 
concluded that the “funneling” effect of the MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet 
wide where it intersects the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet wide where it bisects the 
Industrial Canal, intensified the initial storm surge by about 20 percent and increased the 
velocity of the surge from three to 6–8 feet per second.77  G. Paul Kemp, an 
oceanographer at the LSU Hurricane Center, concluded that the MRGO “funnel” was “a 
back door into New Orleans,” and he had little doubt that it “was the initial cause of the 
disaster.”78  As a result of these levee failures, large areas of flooding occurred within the 
polder containing St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward to the south of the MRGO 
Canal and within the polder containing New Orleans East to the north of the MRGO 
Canal.79   As with the storm surge from Lake Borgne, the barrier project would not have 
protected the two flooded polders from the surge that overtopped and breached the levees 
along the MRGO Canal, because no protection systems were contemplated to prevent the 
“funneling” effect of the canal. 
 The levees lining the Industrial Canal experienced a number of much smaller 
failures along both of its banks.  Several breaches occurred along the eastern bank 
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between the MRGO Canal to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north.80  These 
breaches allowed water to flow to the east into the New Orleans East polder.  The levees 
along the western edge of the Industrial Canal were breached in three places located 
almost directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal adjoins the Industrial 
Canal.81  The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that “storm surges overtopped numerous 
stretches of levees along this Canal frontage.”82  The LSU Hurricane Center’s post-
Katrina modeling exercise concluded that the enhanced velocity of the storm surge as it 
traveled up the MRGO Canal also contributed to the scouring that undermined the levees 
along the Industrial Canal.83  These after-the-fact analyses are consistent with the 
contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster on the Industrial Canal, who reported to 
the Corps of Engineers that the surge reached that canal before dawn and overflowed on 
both sides.84  The lockmaster’s observations also cast doubt on the claim that the surge 
from Lake Pontchartrain caused the levee failures on the Industrial Canal because, 
according to the Corps of Engineers New Orleans Project Manager, the Lake 
Pontchartrain surge occurred much later in the morning after the hurricane’s eye had 
passed east of the city and winds from the north began to force water to the south toward 
the city.85   
 It is theoretically possible that the overtopping and resultant erosion of the 
Industrial Canal levees would have occurred even in the absence of the MRGO Canal 
because of the subsequent storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain.  However, the 
conclusion that the storm surge from the MRGO Canal caused the levee failures along the 
Industrial Canal to fail is amply supported by hindsight observations of the Industrial 
Canal levees, hindsight recreation of the storm surge using sophisticated mathematical 
models, and contemporaneous observations by at least one eye witness.  It bears noting, 
nevertheless, that as of late October the Corps was reserving judgment on whether the 
MRGO contributed to the failure of the Industrial Canal levees in this manner.86 
 
III. The Blame Game 
 
 The above description of the complex system of levees that was supposed to 
protect New Orleans at the time of Hurricane Katrina suggests that the question posed in 
the introduction to this article, “Why did the levees fail?”, is framed too broadly or, 
perhaps, too simplistically.  In fact, many levees failed in many places for many different 
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reasons.  Some were overtopped by floodwaters that then scoured out the levee support 
from inside the protected area.  Others could not withstand the direct pressure of the 
storm surge from outside the protected area because they were not imbedded sufficiently 
deeply in the underlying soils.  Some floodwalls may have come apart during the storm 
surge because connections between individual wall sections failed.  Future investigations 
will no doubt uncover still other suggested reasons for the various levee failures that 
occurred during the Katrina storm surge. 
 Because the levee systems divided the city and surrounding areas into polders, the 
failure of the levee system protecting one polder did not necessarily contribute to the 
damage caused by the failure of the levee system protecting a different polder.  Some 
areas of the city would not have flooded had one levee system held, even if the others had 
failed.  Other areas of the city would not have flooded had two levee systems both held, 
but would have flooded if either of the two failed.  All of these inquiries are essentially 
engineering questions and are best answered through detailed field investigations and 
complex mathematical modeling exercises.  Still, although correct answers to these 
questions are relevant to the post-Katrina blame game, they will not by themselves be 
sufficient to resolve the broader issues raised by Katrina, including the prominent 
contention that NEPA played a causal role in the New Orleans flooding.87 
 Not long after the damage to New Orleans became apparent, a retired Corps of 
Engineers official, conservative pundits, and politicians began a concerted campaign to 
blame the damage on a lawsuit brought against the Corps of Engineers in 1976 by local 
fishermen and a local environmental group called Save Our Wetlands.88  Citing that 
litigation and other clearly irrelevant litigation involving the Mississippi River levee 
system far upstream of New Orleans, conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. 
claimed that “[f]or too long, environmentalist fanatics with no sense of a broad-based 
commonweal have had a veto over government and private-sector projects essential to the 
health and well-being of millions of Americans.”89  A columnist for FrontPage online 
magazine referred to the Save our Wetlands litigation as “green genocide.”90   The 
chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee asked the Justice 
Department to investigate whether any environmental litigation might have played a role 
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in the New Orleans flooding, and high level officials in that Department circulated an 
email to line attorneys asking for information about cases in which they had defended the 
Corps of Engineers from environmental claims involving the levees protecting New 
Orleans.91  The House Task Force on Improving the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA Task Force”)—already controversial due to its perceived heavy-handedness and 
overtly politicized agenda92—decided to add the Save Our Wetlands litigation to its 
agenda as it considered possible amendments to NEPA.93 
 The plaintiffs filed Save Our Wetlands v. Rush94 in 1976, some time after work 
had begun on the levees between New Orleans and the passes at the Rigolets and Chef 
Menteur, but before work had been initiated on the barrier structures.  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) that the Corps of 
Engineers had prepared for the barrier project did not meet the requirements of Section 
102 of NEPA in several regards.  In particular, they claimed that the FEIS had not 
adequately addressed the potential adverse impact of the structures on the normal tidal 
flows of water between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain.  In their view, the flows 
were critical to maintaining the vitality of the Lake Pontchartrain fishery and the overall 
integrity of the marine ecosystem. 
 The district court held that the FEIS was in fact inadequate.  It concluded that “the 
picture of the project painted in the FEIS was not in fact a tested conclusion but a hope by 
the persons planning the project that it could in fact be constructed so as to meet the 
environmental objectives set out in the FEIS.”95  The court noted that the chief engineer 
for the Corps’ New Orleans Division had requested further model studies because the 
studies upon which the draft EIS relied were undertaken more than a decade earlier and 
had addressed an obsolete version of the project.  The chief engineer feared that the flow 
of water between the lakes would be far less in the new version of the project than in the 
earlier version.  The Corps’ environmental staff initiated the requested model studies, but 
they had not completed them when the FEIS came out.  Even though more appropriate 
studies were on the way, the FEIS continued to rely upon the obsolete studies, and this 
unexplained impatience on the part of the Corps clearly troubled the court.96 
 The court was also troubled by the content of the analysis that the FEIS did 
provide and the role of upper level officials in determining that content.  The biological 
analysis presented in the FEIS relied entirely on a single telephone conversation with a 
marine biologist who was asked to speculate about the impact of the project on marine 
organisms using the inter-lake flow rates predicted by the obsolete model.  The Corps of 
Engineers official responsible for preparing the EIS expressed reservations about key 
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statements on the effects of the structures on marine life in the lake, and he suggested that 
the document’s conclusion that the project “would not” have a significant impact on lake 
biology should at least be changed to “should not.”  That official, however, was overruled 
by his superiors.  In addition, the assessment of the barrier project’s benefits included the 
benefits of further urban development on wetlands that would be reclaimed from the lake 
after the project was completed, but it failed to take into consideration the fact that the 
area had also been designated as a protected wetland.  A Corps economist had pointed 
this out and asked that the analysis be modified accordingly.  He, too, was overruled by 
upper level officials.97 
 The court concluded that in light of “the problems of which the Corps was aware 
with respect to the possibility of significantly decreased tidal flow through the 
structures,” the analysis of alternatives in the FEIS was inadequate.  The court concluded 
that the FEIS “precludes both the public and the governmental parties from the 
opportunity to fairly and adequately analyze the benefits and detriments of the proposed 
plan and any alternatives to it.”98  It therefore enjoined further work on the barrier 
structures until the Corps had completed an adequate FEIS.  The court made clear, 
however, that its opinion and order should “in no way be construed as precluding the 
Lake Pontchartrain project as proposed or reflecting on its advisability in any manner,” 
and it stressed that “[u]pon proper compliance with the law with regard to the impact 
statement, this injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly 
presented will be allowed to proceed.”99   
 
IV. Hindsight Analysis of the New Orleans Flooding. 
 
 The starting point in a hindsight causation analysis is careful historical 
reconstruction of the event in question.  The analyst must then compare that 
reconstruction to a hypothetical scenario in which the act or omission alleged to be the 
cause of the consequence at issue did not occur.  If, in this alternative state of the world, 
the harmful event still occurs, then the suspected act or omission is not a “but-for” cause 
of the event.100  Proper hindsight analysis therefore requires both an accurate 
reconstruction of the actual history of the event and a persuasive analysis of the 
appropriate counterfactual scenario.  Of course, such but-for causation analysis by itself 
is insufficient for purposes of assigning legal or moral responsibility, given the variety of 
other considerations that ultimately must be brought to bear on the situation in order to 
move from “but-for” to blameworthiness analysis.101  Nevertheless, the but-for method of 
identifying contributing causes does provide a conventional starting point for the ultimate 
attribution of responsibility.  For post-Katrina NEPA debate, therefore, the first important 
question to ask is whether, but for Save Our Wetlands, would the catastrophic flooding of 
New Orleans still have occurred?  This Part answers that question. 
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A. The Lake Borgne and MRGO levee failures 
 
 From the engineering analysis related above,102 it seems clear beyond cavil that 
the waters that flooded the New Orleans East polder, which lies north of the MRGO 
Canal and west of the intersection of the MRGO Canal and the Intercoastal Waterway, 
came directly from Lake Borgne and indirectly from the Gulf of Mexico via the MRGO 
Canal.  The flooding of the polder to the south of the MRGO Canal and to the east of the 
Industrial Canal resulted when waters flowing up the MRGO Canal overtopped the levees 
along that canal and brought waters into interior of the polder.  This flooding took place 
before the eye of Hurricane Katrina passed to the east of the city and began to drive 
waters from Lake Pontchartrain up the Industrial Canal and the outfall canals in the 
downtown polder.  It clearly did not result from waters entering Lake Pontchartrain from 
Lake Borgne at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes.  Had the barrier project been 
constructed, the flooding of this area would still have occurred due to waters entering the 
polder directly from Lake Borne and traveling up the MRGO Canal from Lake Borgne 
and the Gulf of Mexico.  It is even possible that the flooding of the New Orleans East 
area would have been worse if the barrier plan had been implemented, given that more of 
the surge would have been directed along these channels.  Thus, hindsight causation 
analysis strongly suggests that the lawsuit was not to blame for any of this flooding, and 
few uncertainties cloud this analysis. 
 
B. The Industrial Canal Levee Failures 
 
 Hindsight analysis offers a somewhat less certain answer to the question of 
whether the overtopping of the levees on the west bank of the Industrial Canal would 
have occurred had the Corps of Engineers not abandoned the barrier project.  That project 
was designed to reduce the chance that a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain would 
breach the levees along the lake and along the canals that open to that lake.  It also 
provided for a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control structure where the 
Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain.  Had the barrier project been completed and 
had it functioned properly (a topic addressed below), it would have added to the 
protection of areas placed at risk from overtopping of the Industrial Canal levees to the 
extent that the risk was attributable to waters from Lake Pontchartrain.   
 The engineers have agreed that the levees on the Industrial Canal were overtopped 
and that the breaches probably occurred because waters that flowed over the levees 
scoured out the soils behind those levees.103  Engineering analysis of the levees after the 
flood, hindsight modeling, and the contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster all 
converge on the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the levees in the Industrial 
Canal came from Lake Borgne and points east, rather than from Lake Pontchartrain.  The 
fact that the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overtop the levees bordering the 
outlet canals during Hurricane Katrina further supports the conclusion that the levees 
bordering the Industrial Canal, which parallels those canals, would not have been 
overtopped in the absence of the larger storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal.  
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The fact that the storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal did overtop the levees 
bordering that canal suggests that the MRGO surge had the capacity to overtop the levees 
on the Industrial Canal as the surge proceeded westward.  Finally, the fact that the 
damaged portions of the levees along the west side of the Industrial Canal were directly 
across from the point at which the MRGO Canal enters the Industrial Canal at right 
angles is also consistent with the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the Industrial 
Canal levees came from Lake Borgne and the east, and not from Lake Pontchartrain.   
 As discussed above, the barrier project would not have prevented the storm surge 
that moved westward along the MRGO Canal.  Indeed, had the gated flood control 
structure at the entrance of the Industrial Canal to Lake Pontchartrain been closed as 
envisioned in the barrier project, it could have exacerbated the effects of the storm surge 
moving along the MRGO Canal when it arrived at the Industrial Canal by preventing 
water from exiting the Industrial Canal into Lake Pontchartrain.  It appears, therefore, 
that the failure to build the barrier project did not cause the flooding that resulted from 
the failure of the levees along the Industrial Canal.  That conclusion cannot be stated as 
confidently as the prior conclusion about the flooding that resulted from the failures of 
the levees along the MRGO Canal, because the Industrial Canal was directly connected to 
Lake Pontchartrain and the barrier project (had it functioned properly) would have 
offered protection against waters from that lake.  Moreover, it is still possible—though 
not likely—that all of the preliminary analyses are wrong and that the contemporaneous 
observations were mistaken. 
 
C. The 17th Street and London Avenue Levee Failures 
 
 There is no dispute that the storm surge that caused the 17th Street and London 
Avenue levee failures originated in Lake Pontchartrain.  To the extent that the force of 
the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge would have been reduced by the barrier project, some 
or all of the downtown polder may not have flooded had it been completed prior to 
Katrina.  This is not a minor matter, because the greatest economic damage occurred in 
the downtown polder, and it appears that the largest number of deaths also occurred in 
that polder.104  Even if Save Our Wetlands did not cause all of the flooding in the New 
Orleans area, the claim that it caused the flooding of the downtown polder alone is an 
extremely serious one that bears careful analysis. 
 Several large uncertainties, however, complicate but-for causal analysis of the 
connection between Save Our Wetlands and the flooding of the downtown polder.  First, 
the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop the levees protecting the city 
from the lake itself, and they were not breached.  Moreover, all of the engineering reports 
that have come to light thus far have concluded that the surge flowing from Lake 
Pontchartrain up the outfall canals did not overtop the levees lining those canals.  Like 
the levees along the lake, those levees were designed to be of sufficient height to resist 
overtopping from the SPH, and Katrina apparently did not generate a storm surge 
exceeding that height.  Most engineers have concluded that the levees along the 17th 
Street and London Avenue outfall canals failed because the storm surge forced parts of 
the floodwalls away from the canals and into the surrounding neighborhoods.  The Lake 
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Pontchartrain storm surge did not overwhelm those levees; it simply defeated them at 
critical weak points.  Although the engineering analysis is still clouded with considerable 
uncertainty, it appears that those levees were either designed or constructed in a fashion 
that prevented them from doing what they were supposed to do.105 
 This conclusion, however, does not necessarily lead directly to the ultimate 
conclusion that the failure to construct the barrier project was not a but-for cause of the 
flooding of the downtown polder.  Even if it is true that a cause of the outfall canal levees 
was improper design or improper construction, it is equally clear that neither of those 
factors caused the levees to fail in the absence of the storm surge from Lake 
Pontchartrain.  More to the point, it is certainly possible that the storm surge in Lake 
Pontchartrain would have been much less powerful had barrier gates at the Rigolets and 
Chef Menteur passes been in place and closed before Katrina hit, such that the resulting 
storm surge would have lacked sufficient force to breach the outfall canal levees even at 
their weakest points.  Viewed somewhat differently, the barrier project may have 
provided a critical margin of safety for the overall system that would have prevented the 
flooding of the downtown polder, allowing for the possibility that the outfall canals 
would have been negligently constructed or maintained.   
 A proper hindsight analysis to test this hypothesis would have to estimate the 
force of the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain in a scenario during which the seagates at 
the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes had been properly designed and constructed and 
had been properly closed prior to the time that the surge from Hurricane Katrina moved 
from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain.  The outcome of this 
analysis is by no means certain.  For example, a spokesperson for the New Orleans 
division of the Corps acknowledged after Hurricane Katrina that he was not sure “how 
much [the barrier project] would have prevented anything.”106  Other reports suggest that 
“Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design 
had been built because the storm surge would likely have gone over the top of the barrier 
and floodgates, flooded Lake Pontchartrain, and gone over the original lower levees 
planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan.”107 
 It is necessary to go beyond these statements, however, given that Army Corps 
representatives have obvious reasons for discounting the likelihood that the barrier plan 
would have performed better than the high level plan.  A proper analysis of how the 
barrier plan would have fared during Katrina would require a complex modeling exercise 
that would in turn require the analyst to determine the height of the storm surge at the 
passes and compare it to the design height of the levees and seagates.  As noted 
previously, the project was designed to withstand the SPH, which in New Orleans was 
roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane.108  Although the media 
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initially reported expert conclusions that Katrina was a Category Four Hurricane on the 
Saffir-Simpson scale when the eye passed to the east of New Orleans,109 subsequent 
analyses of the water levels along the levees have suggested that the storm may have 
receded to Category Three status by the time the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain hit 
the city.110  The Saffir-Simpson scale, in any event, is based on wind speed and not 
predicted storm surge levels, and in some circumstances it may be possible for a 
Category Two storm to produce a storm surge that exceeds that of a Category Three 
storm.111  Hence, even estimating the height of the storm surge at the Rigolets and Chef 
Menteur passes is fraught with uncertainty. 
 If the storm surge would have exceeded the height of the levees and seagates 
between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, then the surge would have entered the lake 
at an attenuated level and probably at a lower velocity.  This alone, however, would not 
have prevented a surge in Lake Pontchartrain because the strong northeasterly winds 
produced by the hurricane still would have caused water that was already in the lake to 
surge against the levees protecting New Orleans.  Some of that water would have surged 
up the ungated outfall canals and that surge would have tested the levees.  Whether the 
seagates would have reduced the surge from Lake Pontchartrain sufficiently to prevent 
the breach of poorly designed or constructed levees is therefore an exceedingly complex 
question, the answer to which would require expertise in meteorology, hydrology, 
engineering, mathematical modeling, and probably other disciplines.  Certainly one 
cannot conclude without a great deal of additional analysis that the barrier project as 
conceived in the early 1970s—even if perfectly implemented and executed—would have 
prevented the downtown polder from flooding during Hurricane Katrina. 
 Moreover, even if the analysts could confidently reach that conclusion, a proper 
hindsight analysis also would need to take into account an alternative scenario in which 
the barrier project was not properly implemented.  If it is true, for example, that the high 
level project was poorly implemented, there may be good reason to question whether the 
barrier project would have been implemented as designed.  A proper hindsight analysis 
would therefore factor in the possibility that the levees running from the city to the 
Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes or the seagates at the passes would have been 
breached, just as the levees along the outfall canals were breached.  It might also examine 
the scenario in which the seagates were not properly closed in anticipation of the 
hurricane:  Given the numerous instances of official breakdown that occurred as Katrina 
and its aftermath actually unfolded, such a possibility is not at all farfetched.  In either 
case, the storm surge flowing into Lake Pontchartrain from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake 
Borgne would have been much larger, and the surge that moved up the outfall canals 
might not have differed greatly from the surge that did in fact move up those canals 
during Hurricane Katrina. 
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 The hindsight analysis would next have to examine the effect of Save Our 
Wetlands on the Corps of Engineers’ decision not to build the barrier project.  Some legal 
analysts, including the United States Government Accountability Office, have concluded 
that the Save Our Wetlands injunction should have delayed the barrier option only until 
the Corps remedied the problems that the court had identified in the EIS.112  There is little 
reason to believe that the court would not have lifted the injunction as soon as the Corps 
of Engineers updated the EIS with adequate hydrological modeling (as requested by its 
own chief engineer), conducted a more thorough biological assessment, and considered a 
few reasonable alternatives.  This may have delayed the completion of the project during 
the time that it took for the Corps to finish this task and defend its product in court.  
Although further hypothetical analysis would be required to determine whether this 
would have delayed completion of the barriers past August 2005, there is little reason to 
believe that completion would not have proceeded at least as quickly as the high level 
project, which did not get started until 1985 but which was substantially completed by the 
time that Hurricane Katrina hit.   
 Of course, the Corps of Engineers did not respond to the injunction by preparing 
an adequate EIS for the barrier plan.  Instead, it re-examined the mounting cost of the 
barrier project in light of cost of the alternative high level project and decided to 
implement the latter project.  Thus, one could argue that the litigation caused the Corps to 
rethink the alternatives in a manner that might not have occurred absent the litigation-
induced pause to rethink.113  If the Corps would have forged ahead with the original 
barrier project despite its increasing cost and despite strong local opposition, then the 
lawsuit was indeed a but-for cause of the failure to implement the barrier project—albeit 
only in an attenuated, happenstance way.  The likelihood of even that scenario, moreover, 
must be discounted by the probability that the Corps would have changed course at some 
point anyway prior to completing the project, given the variety of other considerations 
that began to weigh against the barrier plan. 
 
D.  From “But-For” to Blameworthiness 
 
In a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event will be traceable to 
innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s occurrence.114  With respect to the 
levee failures in New Orleans, for instance, potential causal contributors include not only 
Save Our Wetlands, which is said to have led the Corps to adopt an inferior levee plan, 
but also the local residents and officials who long opposed more robust protection plans 
out of cost concerns.115  Additional contributors include the Corps officials who, after a 
lengthy and unexplained delay, ultimately made the decision to switch from the barrier to 
the high level plan; the contractors who allegedly implemented the high level plan with 
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inadequate care; the land use planning officials whose decisions to permit massive 
conversion of wetlands for development rendered New Orleans much more vulnerable to 
storm surges regardless of which plan was adopted; the government officials who were 
responsible for the Mississippi River flood protection system which also perversely made 
New Orleans much more vulnerable to Gulf Coast storms; and perhaps even the 
incalculable number of causal contributors to human-induced climate change which 
might in theory have played a role in exacerbating Katrina’s intensity.116 
Apportioning responsibility and fault among these many but-for causes requires 
much more than simply empirical analysis and reconstruction.  It requires an assignation 
of blameworthiness according to moral, political, and legal criteria.  For seemingly 
opportunistic reasons, a number of officials and analysts have attempted to single out 
Save Our Wetlands for particularly severe blameworthiness in the aftermath of Katrina.  
If the preliminary engineering reports turn out to be correct, however, then the most 
damaging flooding in the New Orleans area is attributable most obviously and directly to 
the MRGO and to inadequate construction and maintenance of the 17th Street and 
London Avenue levees, not to the design of the LPVHPP.117  Analysts who wish to pin 
responsibility for the Katrina disaster on NEPA must therefore offer an account not only 
of how Save Our Wetlands led to the adoption of the high level plan, but also how the 
litigation led to malfeasance in the implementation of that plan.  No serious effort has 
been made to offer such an account, nor is it obvious how one could be constructed with 
any degree of plausibility.   
In the end, the only clear but-for consequence of Save Our Wetlands was a court-
imposed moment of taking stock, a moment in which the Army Corps was asked to 
reevaluate a long-troubled project in light of better information, changed circumstances, 
and competing values—precisely the point of the NEPA procedure.  The Corps 
ultimately retained discretion to proceed with the barrier plan after conducting a proper 
environmental impact assessment, and it certainly need not have waited nearly seven 
years before deciding to abandon the barrier plan as it did.118  In short, one simply cannot 
account for the Corps’ behavior by focusing on NEPA and Save Our Wetlands alone.  
Instead, to appreciate why the Corps planning and implementation process for the 
LPVHPP took the shape that it did, one must broaden the critical focus to include the 
Congress, Army Corps leaders and staff, local residents and officials, scientific and 
engineering experts, government contractors, local and national political interests, and a 
variety of other key decisionmakers and influences.  As the next Section describes, these 
numerous forces combined in New Orleans to create a policymaking process that, at least 
in hindsight, seems to have been especially handicapped in its ability to grapple with 
long-term catastrophic potentialities—the very point of natural disaster policy. 
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V. Lessons for Analysts from the Katrina Levee Debate 
 
One obvious message of the forgoing discussion is that retrospective analysis of 
cause and effect can be an exceedingly complex and uncertainty-laden exercise.  The fact 
that all of the relevant facts are in the past and can, at least in theory, be accurately 
ascertained does not mean that retrospective analysis can avoid the speculation that is 
inherent in prospective analysis:  The counterfactual nature of the causation exercise 
demands a similar task of projecting unknown states of the world in order to determine 
what would have eventuated in the absence of the targeted causal factor.  Hindsight 
analysis of the Katrina disaster suggests that in a changing world, the farther removed the 
analysis is in time from the event under inspection, the more difficult it will be to draw 
confident conclusions about cause and effect.  Failing memories and lost documentation 
can, of course, hinder attempts to reconstruct past histories.  In addition, intervening 
events can greatly complicate the construction and analysis of counterfactual scenarios.  
The more relevant intervening events that are possible, the more the counterfactual 
narrative will become clouded by uncertainties. 
In short, as one moves farther away from the available data—whether in terms 
simply of time, or of the number of additional variables or intervening events—the risk 
increases that one’s conclusions will be based on undefended modeling assumptions 
rather than on actual empirical evidence.119  The NEPA Task Force, many of whose 
members have expressed a strong desire to reduce NEPA’s procedural requirements, 
seems to have fallen prey to just such an undefended assumption in its haste to attribute 
the Katrina levee failures to NEPA litigation.  Hindsight analysis of the Katrina disaster 
offers no support at all for legislative action aimed at repealing or amending NEPA to 
reduce the incidence of judicial intervention into Executive Branch activities under that 
statute.  As discussed above, the causal analysis that leads from a 1976 injunction 
pending the preparation of an adequate EIS to the flooding of the downtown polder in 
2005 is so laden with uncertainty, and so dependant on unsupported speculation, that it 
simply cannot provide a rational justification for an action as momentous as overhauling 
one of modern federal environmental law’s keystone statutes. 
Nevertheless, as this Section describes, the history of the LPVHPP planning 
process does offer some reliable lessons regarding the challenge of natural disaster 
policymaking, lessons that should guide analysts as they consider post-Katrina hurricane 
protection for New Orleans and other projects that guard against long-term, low-
probability, high-consequence events.  The rather pessimistic conclusion reached above 
regarding our powers of accurate, comprehensive hindsight analysis is likewise 
applicable to our predictive analysis of future consequences of government interventions.  
The systems that drive the incidence and severity of disaster consequences—whether in 
the form of natural systems that give rise to extreme weather and geological events, or of 
socioeconomic systems that determine in part how deadly and costly the consequences of 
such events will be—are characterized by enormous complexity and uncertainty.  What 
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often will be required in disaster planning, therefore, is collective judgment regarding the 
degree of moral and political commitment that citizens desire to express, both to their 
fellow citizens within the present generation and to the generations to come, through 
public prevention and mitigation projects that may have highly uncertain long-term 
payoffs.  As this Section describes, through familiar tools of risk assessment and policy 
analysis, the LPVHPP planning process seems to have inadvertently obscured the need 
for precisely that brand of judgment. 
 
A. The Standard Project Hurricane 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many commentators assumed 
that New Orleans had finally outrun its luck.  As noted above, initial reports suggested 
that Katrina made landfall as a storm with a severity and a path that numerous experts 
repeatedly had warned would someday strike the city with catastrophic results, a storm 
that simply overwhelmed the design standard of the LPVHPP and other New Orleans 
area levee systems.120  At least at this stage, however, engineering reports point instead to 
a failure of implementation, such that it is quite possible that Katrina would not have 
overwhelmed the New Orleans levees had they been constructed and maintained 
properly.  Still, this more mundane and lamentable explanation of the Katrina levee 
failure does not obviate the need to look closely at the levee design process for evidence 
of significant failures in our thinking about long-term catastrophic risks.  Unfortunately, 
the many pre-Katrina warnings that seemed so prophetic in the storm’s immediate 
aftermath remain urgently relevant today, both to the post-Katrina reconstruction process 
and to the challenge of natural disaster policy more generally. 
 At the heart of the LPVHPP and most other Army Corps hurricane protection 
projects since the 1960s has been a technical model known as the standard project 
hurricane (SPH).121  Because development of this model preceded the Saffir-Simpson 
hurricane scale, attempts to describe the design standard of the LPVHPP in the wake of 
Katrina have been somewhat confused.  Depending on whether one is referring to 
barometric pressure, radius, wind speed, or other critical storm characteristics, the SPH 
can vary from a Category Two to Four storm on the now more familiar Saffir-Simpson 
scale122 (although most commentators have been describing the SPH as “roughly 
equivalent” to a fast moving Category Three storm).  Nor does the SPH translate 
smoothly into the conventional return period approach of describing storms in relation to 
their expected interval of occurrence.  Again, analysts have been describing the SPH as 
“roughly equivalent” to the worst storm that could be expected every 200 to 300 years,123 
although in actuality the SPH bears no direct relationship to such return-period or 
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frequency intervals.  As the National Weather Service stated in a 1972 technical 
memorandum, “the standard project hurricane has no frequency assigned to it.”124 
 The SPH was developed by the Corps of Engineers at the request of Congress in 
the 1950s “to provide generalized hurricane specifications that are consistent 
geographically and meteorologically for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing 
hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection works.”125  In conjunction with the U.S. 
Weather Bureau, the Corps compiled data on all tropical storms of hurricane intensity 
within specific geographic zones over the period from 1900 to 1956.126  Using this data, 
the agencies created an index representing “the most severe combination of hurricane 
parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified geographical region, excluding 
extremely rare combinations.”127  Specifically, central barometric pressure was used as 
the main estimation characteristic to generate a hypothetical or model storm for project 
planning with respect to any given geographic area.  Although the original SPH model 
used a 100-year return period to identify the key central pressure measure for a given 
area,128 the resulting model hurricane did not, strictly speaking, represent a 100-year 
storm.  Instead, the 100-year pressure low was interpolated with other storm 
characteristics such as storm radius, wind speed, forward speed, and storm direction to 
generate “the most severe conditions . . . that are within the parameters of the SPH 
indices . . . for [a particular] location,”129 a procedure that results in SPH storms of 
varying frequency depending on location-specific criteria. 
 Initially, an overriding goal of the SPH appears to have been simply a desire to 
compare hurricane protection standards from region to region:  “The standard project 
hurricane wind field and parameters represent a ‘standard’ against which the degree of 
protection finally selected for a hurricane protection project may be judged and compared 
with protection provided at projects in other localities.”130  This standardized approach, 
however, led to disparities within particular localities.  Different parts of the New Orleans 
area, for instance, are at higher risk from hurricanes than others.  Because suburban areas 
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across the Mississippi river from New Orleans are not at risk from Lake Pontchartrain, 
they face a 1 in 500 risk of flooding from a storm surge in a given year, whereas the 
downtown polder fronting the lake faced a 1 in 300 risk just prior to Hurricane Katrina.  
Likewise, the areas in the two polders to the east of the Industrial Canal, which were at 
risk from a storm surge flowing up the MRGO Canal, faced an annual risk of between 1 
in 200 (according to the Corps analysis) and 1 in 100 (according to an analysis 
undertaken by a former Corps engineer who is now a private consultant).   
 The Corp’s chief engineer for the New Orleans district, Al Naomi, questions the 
Corp’s authority to take these varying risk levels into account in planning for future storm 
protections.  In his view, Congress has mandated that all areas in the entire region be 
protected from the same model storm.  Thus, the levees in place throughout the city prior 
to Hurricane Katrina were designed to withstand a storm surge of 11.5 feet, ignoring the 
fact that some areas in the region are likely to encounter storm surges of that magnitude 
much more frequently than others.  As discussed above, the Berkeley/ASCE study 
concluded that the storm surge along the MRGO Canal exceeded the levees by as much 
as 10–15 feet, even though the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop any 
of the levees in the downtown polder.131  Building higher levees in the areas that are, for 
geographical reasons, subject to more frequent storm surges would, according to Naomi, 
violate the Corp’s legal mandate.  In his view, Congress would have to authorize such 
variation specifically in legislation before the Corps could take it into account in 
designing future levees.132 
 Deciding how to define and implement equity concerns within the natural disaster 
context is a daunting task.133  Should regulators seek to equalize the probabilistic risk that 
individuals face, or the amount of public money spent on protection per individual?  To 
what extent should the seemingly voluntary choices of individuals to live in particularly 
vulnerable areas factor into the public policy assessment?  How should disaster planning 
take account of the socioeconomic differences between, say, Trent Lott, whose historic 
oceanfront home in Mississippi was destroyed by Katrina, and the thousands of poverty-
stricken New Orleans residents whose homes also were known to be located in areas of 
great vulnerability?134  These are vital moral and political questions that currently receive 
little attention from the Corps or from Congress, perhaps in part because the SPH 
provides an unwarranted sense that relevant geographical variations already have been 
“accounted for.”135 
Over time, moreover, the SPH seems to have acquired an even stronger 
presumption of normativity, being described frequently in Corps documents and other 
proceedings as the most severe storm that the government “reasonably” or “practicably” 
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should guard against when designing hurricane protection projects.  Thus, the SPH came 
to represent not only a method for comparative assessment of storm risks across 
geographic areas, but also a design standard that carries its own implicit assurance of 
optimality: 
 
• “The SPH is intended as a practicable expression of the maximum degree of 
protection that should be sought as a general rule in planning and design of 
coastal structures for communities where protection of human life and destruction 
of property is involved.”136 
 
• “An SPH is one that may be expected from the most severe combination of 
meteorological conditions that are considered reasonably characteristic in the 
region.”137 
 
• “The project has been designed to afford complete protection from the occurrence 
of the largest probable storm (SPH) that can reasonably be expected in the region.  
…  Probability of occurrence of hurricanes having a greater magnitude than the 
SPH are too remote to warrant practical consideration.”138 
 
• “The project is designed to protect against the ‘standard project hurricane’ 
moving on the most critical track.  Only a combination of hydrologic and 
meteorologic circumstances anomalous to the region could produce higher stages.  
The probability of such a combination occurring is, for all practical purposes, 
nil.”139 
 
• “[The SPH] was expected to have a frequency of occurrence of once in about 200 
years, and represented the most severe combination of meteorological conditions 
considered reasonably characteristic for the region.”140 
 
• “To identify a level of risk a given area faces, we do an engineering and an 
economic analysis and come to an optimum solution for a level of protection.”141 
                                                 
136 Preliminary Revised Standard Project Hurricane Criteria for the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the 
United States, Memorandum HUR 7-120, June 1972. 
137 See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project I-2 (August 1974). 
138 See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (August 1974). 
139 See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project VIII-11 (August 1974). 
140 GAO, Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee Maintenance and 
Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, at 4. 
141 John McQuaid & Bill Walsh, Warnings to Beef Up New Orleans’ 60s-Era Levees Unheeded 
(quoting Gen. Carl Strock, Army Corps chief of engineers) (emphasis added).  Statements such as these 
recall the claim of the Corps’ Chief of Engineers in 1926—one year before the devastating Mississippi 
River flood that remains one of the country’s worst ever natural disasters—that the lower Mississippi River 
levee system would “prevent the destructive effects of floods.”  David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The 
Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803 307, 314, in The Financing of Catastrophic Risk 
(Kenneth A. Froot, ed, 1999). 
 30
 
By tracing the SPH back to its origins, however, one finds strong basis for 
doubting the wisdom of this gradual normative reification of the design standard.  To 
begin with, the SPH is obviously only as reliable as the data it is built upon.  The original 
SPH model, which appeared in National Hurricane Research Program Report No. 33 in 
1959, was built using data on all Atlantic tropical storms from 1900 to 1956 that reached 
hurricane intensity at some point during their lifetimes.  As the authors of the 1959 report 
acknowledged, much of the data used was unreliable given the great imprecision of the 
available measurement technology.  In particular, for much of the data the researchers 
had to extrapolate from land-based measurements in order to determine an estimate for 
off-shore storm pressure, because it was not until later in the twentieth century that 
scientists began using aircraft to measure storm pressure offshore. 
Even assuming valid measurements, however, the 57 year record was quite 
limited in scope—containing only 22 storms in total for Zone B, the geographic area that 
corresponded to New Orleans—and was obviously insufficient to generate a statistically 
significant rendering of the overall distribution of potential storms from a multi-century 
perspective.142  The researchers attempted to extrapolate from the existing data by, first, 
calculating the cumulative number of storms that had appeared during the observation 
period at or below various levels of pressure (see figure 3).  This measure was then 
converted to a 100 year index simply by linearly stretching the data out from 56 to 100 
years.  Finally, the data were plotted on normal distribution graph paper with the idea 
that, if the observed data appeared to fall into a straight line, then one could conclude that 
hurricane frequency follows a normal distribution and, therefore, that extrapolationg to 
longer return periods could be accomplished simply by following the observed trend line 
(see figure 4).   
 
                                                 
142 Preliminary Revised Standard Project Hurricane Criteria for the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the 
United States, Memorandum HUR 7-120, June 1972.  Even with respect to the data that were available, one 
of the more severe storms in the geographic zone containing New Orleans was listed in the table, but a 
footnote disclosed that the storm was not used in the construction of the SPH because the frequency index 
had already been calculated by the time the storm occurred. 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
There may be reason to doubt these assumptions.  Looking at Zone A—which 
included Florida and areas east of New Orleans (see figure 5)—one observes that, in 
addition to the much sharper slope of the pressure data, at least one recorded storm lies 
far outside the normal distribution trend.  Of course, that is just one storm and it is very 
difficult to say whether it represents a 100, 500, or 10,000 year storm.  But that is 
precisely the point:  With such a small sample, there is really not much empirically 
supporting the assumption that storm intensity will follow a normal distribution.  Instead, 
the decision to extrapolate linearly is one that depended on a relatively unexamined 
conviction that Gulf storm behavior follows the tidy world of classical mathematics.  It 
may well, of course, but it may also represent what Dan Farber has called the world of 
“probabilities behaving badly,” a world in which complex, adaptive systems are 
characterized not by normal probability distributions, but by power law distributions in 
which extreme events appear with a surprising regularity.143 
 
Figure 5 
 
                                                 
143 See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145, 152-55 (2003). 
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Along those lines, consider a few facts from the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season: 
 
• Twenty-seven Atlantic storms were named during 2005, the most on record, 
shattering the previous record of 21 from 1933.  For the first time, meteorologists 
had to reach into the Greek alphabet for additional storm names. 
 
• Fifteen hurricanes were observed, breaking the old record of 12 set in 1969. 
 
• The most category 5 storms ever recorded in one season (Katrina, Rita, and 
Wilma). 
 
• Wilma became the strongest hurricane on record in the Atlantic basin, as 
measured by barometric pressure.  Three of the six strongest hurricanes on record 
occurred in 2005. 
 
• Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds of 125 mph and a minimum 
central pressure of 27.13 inches, the third lowest on record at landfall behind 
Hurricane Camille from 1969 and the Labor Day Hurricane that struck the Florida 
Keys in 1935.144 
 
• Katrina was the costliest U.S. hurricane on record.  In addition, the overall season 
tally for damage was the costliest in U.S. history. 
 
                                                 
144 See also Government Accountability Office, Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, GAO-06-322T, 
at p. 5 (reporting that at landfall Katrina had a central barometric pressure of 27.17 inches and a windspeed 
of 140 mph). 
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• Hurricane Vince became the first known instance of a tropical cyclone making 
landfall in Spain. 
 
• Hurricane Delta became only the sixth hurricane on record in December since 
1851. 
 
• Tropical cyclone Zeta became the longest-lived tropical cyclone ever recorded in 
January. 
 
A critical question facing disaster planners going forward is whether the classical 
scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear biophysical behavior 
is appropriate in a world of complexity and climate change.  Even putting aside these 
problems of model uncertainty,145 however, one still faces the basic decision of how 
conservative to be in setting the benchmark for the SPH.  The 1959 researchers focused 
on central barometric pressure and constructed a table reflecting the lowest central 
pressure index that one would expect at various geographic locations with an annual 
probability of 1%.  In other words, they chose the 100 year return period for central 
pressure, as estimated using their admittedly limited data sample and their contestable 
extrapolation technique.  Figure 6 shows the resulting values at various geographic 
locations throughout the Gulf.  For New Orleans, the 100 year estimate was 27.60 inches.  
Again, the SPH was not equivalent to a 100 year storm, because central pressure was then 
interpolated with other variables in a way that tended to make the SPH more severe at 
any given point than a 100 year storm.  How much more, however, is hard to say because 
the SPH depends on location specific combinations of these variables.  That is why the 
New Orleans levee system was frequently described as having been designed to guard 
against something like a 200 to 300 year storm. 
 
                                                 
145 One engineer who examined the New Orleans levee system in 2002 concluded that “risks may 
be significantly higher than the Corps maintains—perhaps double—on the east side along levees protecting 
eastern New Orleans, the Lower 9th Ward, Arabi and Chalmette.”  John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, 
Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a Greater Threat from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected, 
Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002 (quoting Louisiana State University engineering professor Joseph 
Suhayda). 
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Figure 6 
 
 
Still, why anchor on a 100 year central pressure index, rather than 500 or 10,000 
years?  As the Corps noted in its 1972 revision of the SPH, this decision to hinge 
determination of the SPH on a 100-year central pressure index return period was 
essentially an “arbitrary” one when considered from the scientific perspective.146  This is 
not to say that the original analysts were unjustified in choosing a 100-year return period 
for central pressure or that some other period was obviously more appropriate.  It is 
simply to say that the question was not a purely technical one.147  One can find clues as to 
those non-technical considerations in contemporaneous descriptions of the SPH model, 
where commentators describe the model as being used to project the worst storm that is 
“economically reasonable” to guard against.148  In fact, some Corps economists at the 
time believed that the SPH was too cautious, and that a less severe storm should be used 
as the benchmark for disaster planning and prevention.   
                                                 
146 Preliminary Revised Standard Project Hurricane Criteria for the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the 
United States, Memorandum HUR 7-120, June 1972. 
147  Even on narrow economic grounds, the choice of a 100-year return period for natural disaster 
planning might be questioned:  Studies suggest, for instance, that a large majority (66%-85%) of flood 
losses come from events with recurrence intervals less frequent than the 100-year flood.  See Burby, supra 
note __.  Again, though, it bears noting that the SPH does not strictly speaking represent a 100-year storm.  
See supra text accompanying notes __-__. 
148   
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This murky blending of science and policy continued in the much more elaborate 
and technical 1979 overhaul of the SPH .  In this report, the SPH was changed so that the 
critical pressure parameter was derived not from the 100 year lowest expected pressure, 
but from the average of the seven lowest actually observed storms (see figure 7).   
 
Figure 7 
 
 
This procedure may seem to be an improvement over the arbitrary selection of a 
100 year low, but it still begs the question, why not take the lowest 5 storms, or the single 
lowest storm, or even the single lowest storm with an additional safety margin included?  
In fact, the researchers did something quite the oppositein that they excluded the two 
worst observed storms from their seven lowest storm index:  Hurricane Camille from 
1969, and the Labor Day storm of 1933.  The reasons provided for this exclusion are 
somewhat obscure in the report:  “Our decision was based on the idea that these two 
hurricanes contained extremely low po’s resulting in sustained wind speeds that were not 
reasonably characteristic of the northern gulf coast and the Florida Keys.”149 
To be sure, excluding outlier data is standard practice for much statistical 
analysis, yet the move seems inappropriate in the context of natural disaster planning.  
The extreme tails of a distribution in this context may be precisely the areas of most 
                                                 
149 Richard W. Schwert et al., Meteorological Criteria for Standard Project Hurricane and Problem 
Maximum Hurricane Windfields, Gulf and East Coasts of the United States 143 (1979).  See also id. 
(“These two hurricanes are much more severe than any other in the gulf and are therefore not ‘reasonably 
characteristic.’”); id. at 2 (“By reasonably characteristic is meant that only a few hurricanes of record over a 
large region have had more extreme values of the meteorological parameters.”).. 
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interest and concern.150  After all, the two storms excluded—Camille and the Labor Day 
storm—were the only two on record with a lower central pressure than Katrina.  The 
subjective nature of the data-trimming judgment is implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in 
the technical report, when the analysts recommend use of an alternative, much more 
conservative measure—the probable maximum hurricane—for disaster planning “in 
locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a threat to the public 
health and safety from a hurricane-induced accident at a nuclear power plant.”151  Why 
not use this higher standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power 
plants?  As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide protection against 
the probable maximum hurricane would, in most locations, be economically 
unjustified.”152  Thus, loaded into the SPH model again is an implicit cost-benefit 
calculation, one that prevents policymakers from asking directly whether an extreme 
event is worth guarding against simply by excluding the possibility that such an event 
will occur. 
Marshalling support for current public investment in long-term disaster 
prevention and mitigation projects is a political challenge of the highest magnitude.  As 
Kenneth Boulding once wryly noted, “it seems very hard to organize a long-run crisis.”153  
Given this difficulty, one advantage of the conventional return period approach to 
describing flood and storm protection projects is its ready accessibility to non-expert 
audiences.154  For instance, when the Dutch suffered a devastating storm in 1953 that 
killed 2,000 people, the nation embarked on a 30-year plan to protect the country against 
the worst storm that could be expected in 10,000 years.155  Similarly, when a massive 
Mississippi River flood in 1927 killed several hundred individuals, displaced over five 
hundred thousand, and destroyed property worth some $3 billion (1993 dollars),156 
Congress and the Corps developed an especially robust Mississippi River flood 
protection system that was designed to withstand an 800-year flood, some five hundred 
                                                 
150 Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly. 
151 Richard W. Schwert et al., Meteorological Criteria for Standard Project Hurricane and Problem 
Maximum Hurricane Windfields, Gulf and East Coasts of the United States 5 (1979). 
152 Perdikis, supra note __, at 9.  The new conservative approach of taking seven of the lowest 
storms on record did result in a further revision downward of the New Orleans SPH central pressure 
measure, from 27.36 to 27.30.  Nevertheless, Katrina made landfall with a pressure of 27.13 inches—an 
intensity that was clearly foreseeable to the designers of the SPH model, as a comparison of the SPH and 
the MPH estimates for New Orleans demonstrates. 
153 Kenneth E. Boulding, Spaceship Earth Revisited, in Valuing The Earth: Economics, Ecology, 
Ethics 311, 311 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993). 
154 As cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has shown, individuals appear to process risk 
information much more reliably when it is presented in frequency rather than probability terms.  See, e.g., 
Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency 
Formats, 102 Psychol. Rev. 684, 697-98 (1995); G. Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic 
Mental Models, in Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives 284 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. 
Over eds., 1993); Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence: An Adaptation for Frequencies, in The 
Evolution of Mind 11-15 (Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Colin Allen eds., 1998); Gerd Gigerenzer, How to 
Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, 2 Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 83 
(Wolfgang Strobe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1991). 
155 See supra note __. 
156 Id. at 308. 
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years more forward-looking than the LPVHPP.157  By most reports, the Mississippi River 
system performed extremely well during Hurricane Katrina despite storm surges that 
reached 15 to 20 feet along river stretches below New Orleans.158 
Did the relative opacity of the SPH prevent the development of political support 
for a more robust hurricane protection system along the lines of the Mississippi River 
system?  Almost certainly not.  As the GAO reported in 1982, state and local sponsors in 
New Orleans repeatedly “recommended that the Corps lower its design standards to 
provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a hurricane whose intensity 
might occur once every 100 years rather than building a project to withstand a once in 
200- to 300-year occurrence.”159  Still, over time, more widely comprehensible protection 
standards might help to overcome the apparent reluctance of political constituencies to 
support long-term, intergenerational disaster planning.  Currently, the Association of 
State Floodplain Managers advocates a 500 year storm level of protection for urban areas 
and critical facilities.160  The wisdom of such a standard depends in part on technical 
engineering and economic factors, but it also depends critically on the public’s attitude 
toward risk, uncertainty, and intergenerational obligation.  Rather than highlight such 
concerns for public scrutiny and deliberation, the SPH seems to have buried them within 
a confidently-expressed, but ultimately illusory assurance of “reasonableness” and 
“optimality.” 
 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Since the Flood Control Act of 1936, Army Corps of Engineers project funding 
has been limited by Congress to those projects that have demonstrated benefits in excess 
of costs.161  This early form of regulatory cost-benefit analysis was not originally 
associated with a perceived need for agency discipline, as it is today, but rather with a 
conviction that science, empiricism, and expert judgment could lead to wise 
policymaking.162  Over time, such New Deal optimism became replaced by a more 
skeptical view of government, and the Army Corps in particular seemed to attract 
scrutiny from interests all along the political spectrum who began to view the statutory 
cost-benefit requirement as a valuable check on the otherwise overreaching impulses of 
the Corps.  In part for reasons such as this, a number of prominent scholars and officials 
                                                 
157 As one expert put it:  “The city is exposed to as much as four times the risk of hurricane 
flooding as it is to river flooding.  That’s always been an odd issue to me.  Why would the government 
think that water from the lake is less dangerous than water from the river?”  John McQuaid & Mark 
Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a Greater Threat from Hurricanes than Previously 
Suspected, Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002 (quoting Louisiana State University engineering professor 
Joseph Suhayda). 
158 Bob Marshall, Levee System Along River Held Its Ground in Storm, Times-Picayune, Jan. 23, 
2006. 
159 (emphasis added). 
160 Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  Using Mitigation 
to Rebuild a Safer Gulf Coast 4, available at 
http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_HurricaneKatrina_WhitePaper_090905.pdf. 
161 See Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 701a). 
162 See Theodore M. Porter, Trust In Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life 148-89 (1995). 
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today regard the use of formal cost-benefit analysis to be of critical importance to the 
future of environmental, health, and safety regulation.163 
The history of the LPVHPP planning process, however, suggests that the cost-
benefit requirement may have had undesirable distortionary effects on Corps 
decisionmaking.  A report in the Washington Post, for instance, claimed that the critical 
normative judgments described above regarding the construction of the SPH were driven 
in part by concern that the cost-benefit constraint facing Corps’ projects would not justify 
higher levels of storm protection.164  In fact, an Army Corps official in 1978 reported that 
economic cost-benefit analyses at the time were prescribing an even lower level of 
protection than the SPH.165  No doubt these economic conclusions were driven in part by 
the standard use of a 3.25 percent discount rate in evaluating monetized projects costs 
and benefits,166 a procedure that scholars have shown to reflect a clumsy and inadequate 
way of addressing questions of intergenerational equity, particularly in the face of very 
long-range planning of the sort implicated by disaster policy.167 
                                                 
163 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L. 
J. 165 (1999); Kenneth J. Arrow Et Al., Is There A Role For Cost-Benefit Analysis In Environmental, 
Health, And Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty 
And The Evaluation Of Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 364, 366-67 (1970); Stephen 
Breyer, Breaking The Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993); Richard A. Posner, 
Catastrophe: Risk And Response (2004); Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification 
And Comment On Conference Papers, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1153 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Laws Of Fear: 
Beyond The Precautionary Principle (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Risk & Reason: Safety, Law, And The 
Environment (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State Ix (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition And 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059 (2000). 
164 “The Corps was required to recommend the project with the most economic benefits—no 
matter who received them—compared to the cost to the taxpayers.  It could not consider whether the 
benefits would be fairly distributed, or the value of wetlands the project might destroy, or even the value of 
protecting people from death.  So the Corps settled on 200-year protection from storms, a sharp contrast to 
the 800-year protection from the river.”  Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, The Slow Drowning of 
New Orleans, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2005, at A01. 
165 Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Jan. 5, 1978 Hearings (“Even 
though economists may, and in this case did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of 
project benefits to project costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project 
hurricane.”) (testimony of J. Rush, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans).  See also 
U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 89-90 (2006). 
166 See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (August 1974). 
167 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing The Price Of 
Everything And The Value Of Nothing (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural 
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 Boston College Envtl. Affairs L. Rev. 555 (2004); 
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1563 (2002); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 
Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 675 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the 
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 Boston College L. Rev. 1, 28-36 (2001); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Discounting Our Future, 34 Land & Water L. Rev. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and 
the Present Future, 87 Geo. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 Yale L.J. 1911 
(1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L. J. 1981 (1998); Tyler 
Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups And Generations 
144 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. Howarth, 
Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in Ecological Economics:  The Science And Management Of 
Sustainability 88, 97–98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991). 
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It also bears noting that the Corps typically does not take potential loss of life into 
account when conducting cost-benefit analyses of its projects.  According to the GAO, 
the Corps’ guidance (Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the 
issue of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans, but they are not 
required to formally estimate the number of lives saved or lost as a potential effect of a 
project.168  In situations where historical data exist, the analysts have the option to 
estimate the number of persons potentially affected by a project and include this number 
as an additional factor for the consideration of decision makers.  Hence, a high cost 
project that has few economic benefits, but which would save many lives, may not pass 
the cost-benefit test since the Corps does not include the lives saved as an explicitly 
monetized benefit. 
 In practice, this exclusion of saved human lives from cost-benefit calculation may 
have contributed to the Corps’ apparent practice of liberally including prospects for 
private development as part of its flood control and hurricane protection projects.  
Because the Corps did not include saved human lives or ecological values in its cost-
benefit analyses, the bulk of the identified benefit from hurricane protection tended to 
come from the safeguarding of real and personal property.169  Thus, in order to generate a 
higher regulatory “budget” for project planning purposes, the Corps seems naturally to 
have been tempted to design projects in ways that generated easily identifiable and 
monetizable property protection benefits, even if that meant the earmarking of wetlands 
for future development that might otherwise have remained in their natural, storm surge 
dampening state.170  Indeed, a key aspect of the local opposition to the LPVHPP centered 
on the question of whether the Corps had gone beyond protecting existing and anticipated 
land developments to actively promoting new development that would not have occurred 
but for the Corps’ activities.171  As one analyst noted, “[a]n extraordinary 79% [of the net 
benefits from the LPVHPP] were to come from new development that would now be 
feasible with the added protection provided by the improved levee system.”172 
 The use of cost-benefit analysis for purposes of environmental, health, and safety 
regulation is, of course, highly controversial and a full treatment of the subject is well 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Even if the Corps had included human health and 
                                                 
168 Government Accountability Office, Improved Analysis of Costs and Benefits Needed for 
Sacramento Flood Protection Project 20 n.13 (2003) (GAO-04-3). 
169 See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (August 1974) (reporting only 
property damage prevention, land intensification, and redevelopment as itemized annual benefits); id. 
(“Environmental losses were not evaluated in dollar terms.”). 
170 See id. at ii (“Indirectly, the plan will hasten urbanization and industrialization of valuable 
marshes and swamps by providing for further flood protection and land reclamation.”); (“Several areas 
would be rendered more suitable for urban use as a result of the project works.  This effect will be reflected 
in increases in value of these lands, which increases are called ‘enhancement benefits,’ since they do 
represent additions to the Gross National Product.”). 
171 See text accompanying notes 31-36, supra. 
172 Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: 
Bringing about Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, Annals Am. Academy Pol. & Soc. 
Sci., March 2006 (citing GAO 1976 Report).  This conflation of protection and promotion purposes appears 
to be common within flood control and hurricane protection planning.  See Raymond J. Burby & Steven P. 
French, Flood Plain Land Use Managed: A National Assessment (1985) (finding positive correlation 
between community flood controls works and the amount of new development taking place in flood hazard 
areas after flood control works completed). 
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environmental values within its cost-benefit calculations, theoretically and normatively 
difficult questions would have remained regarding how to monetize those values and how 
to account for their inter-temporal distribution.173  What the Katrina planning process 
more narrowly seems to show, however, is yet another way in which cost-benefit analysis 
in practice leads to the very kinds of political and analytical distortions that the procedure 
is designed to guard against.  For example, some observers of the regulatory process 
(including one of the authors of this article) have advocated greater use of retrospective 
cost analysis as a check on what appear to be systematic overestimates of industry 
regulatory compliance costs in prospective cost-benefit analysis—a distortion that leads 
to unduly modest levels of investment in environmental, health, and safety regulation.174  
Similarly, in the Katrina context, the failure to account adequately for the lifesaving 
purposes of hurricane protection seems to have led the Corps not only to understate the 
monetary justification for hurricane protection, but also to promote private land 
development schemes that may well have been counterproductive from the perspective of 
guarding against storm surges. 
 
C. Priority Setting 
 
The Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting priorities for its 
projects.  Once the Corps has determined that the benefits of a proposed project exceed 
its costs, the Corps leaves it to Congress to decide through the appropriations process 
those projects that receive funding and those that do not.175  The Corps’ reluctance in this 
regard is somewhat understandable, given the agency’s desire to appear to be a 
politically-neutral, expert-driven body, rather than the self-aggrandizing pork processor it 
often is depicted to be in more cynical political discussion.176  Yet the Corps’ relative 
agnosticism on priorities deprives congressional decisionmakers of crucial contextual 
information regarding the relative seriousness of proposed projects.  As one observer 
noted, “[s]aving New Orleans gets no more emphasis than draining wetlands to grow 
corn and soybeans.”177 
                                                 
173 See sources cited supra note __. 
174 Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1997 (2002).  See also Office of Management and Budget, 
Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local and Tribal Entities ch. 3 (2005).  Of course, to the extent that 
hindsight analysis of regulatory costs involves speculation about how regulated entities would have 
addressed the hazards of the regulated activity in the absence of the regulatory intervention (e.g., to avoid 
potential tort liability), the value of retrospective cost assessments may prove illusory.  It should be noted, 
however, that many regulatory interventions address environmental hazards, the costs of which are 
relatively easily externalized, and health hazards, the costs of which are unevenly internalized by tort law.  
In these situations, the assumption that the regulated entities would have taken little or no action to address 
such hazards may yield a fairly accurate regulatory cost assessment. 
175 populate. 
176 See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Money Flowed to Questionable Projects, Washington Post, Sept. 
8, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090702462.html (“Despite a series of independent investigations 
criticizing Army Corps construction projects as wasteful pork-barrel spending, Louisiana's representatives 
have kept bringing home the bacon.). 
177 Cf. Michael Grunwald, Money Flowed to Questionable Projects, Washington Post, September 
8, 2005, at A1 (quoting Tim Searchinger, senior attorney, Environmental Defense).   
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The Corps’ agnosticism in this regard also encourages piecemeal, project-by-
project congressional decisionmaking, when instead a more comprehensive approach is 
required that integrates flood control, hurricane protection, coastal restoration, ecosystem 
preservation, and mitigation projects within a single framework.  The much-criticized 
MRGO Canal, for instance, might have appeared to be a far less attractive project had it 
been analyzed as part of a more direct and inclusive effort to balance economic 
development with human safety and the environment.  As Professor Oliver Houck has 
noted, the MRGO costs taxpayers thousands of dollars per ship passing while it has 
destroyed 26,000 acres of cypress hardwood and marsh.  As a result, “environmentalists 
have been trying to get [it] closed for 25 years.”178  Thus, for a variety of reasons beyond 
just its potentially risk-enhancing qualities with respect to hurricanes, the MRGO seems 
to represent indefensible public policy.  The full egregiousness of the project, however, is 
difficult to perceive when its implications are analyzed only in a piecemeal fashion. 
Moreover, the polder containing the Ninth Ward and parts of St. Bernard Parish 
that flooded during Hurricane Katrina also was inundated in 1965 during Hurricane 
Betsy, a fast moving CategoryThree hurricane.  Officials at the time suggested that the 
MRGO Canal had acted like a funnel, channeling the storm surge from the Gulf of 
Mexico into New Orleans.179  A Times-Picayune article in 2002 later noted that 
“proponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it has evolved into a shotgun pointed 
straight at New Orleans, should a major hurricane approach from that angle.”180  Levee 
analysis and sophisticated modeling exercises have led some experts to conclude that this 
very shotgun fired during Hurricane Katrina, with devastating results.181  While it is 
certainly possible that the polder would have flooded even if the MRGO Canal had not 
existed in 1965 and again in 2005, policymakers could reasonably conclude that filling in 
the MRGO Canal now would eliminate a potential cause of future flooding.182   
In order to appreciate these multidimensional implications of the MRGO Canal, 
one must move beyond narrowly framed modes of policy analysis and embrace 
something more like the emerging sustainable development paradigm, in which the many 
determinants of human well-being and environmental sustainability are treated as aspects 
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of a single complex, but integrated public policy framework.183  It makes little sense, for 
instance, to talk about the optimal post-Katrina hurricane protection plan for New 
Orleans without also discussing wetlands, housing and transportation, climate change and 
energy, and a host of other policy areas that undoubtedly and significantly will impact the 
very parameters that also guide hurricane protection planning.  Such decisionmaking will 
not lend itself to formulaic resolution.  It is necessarily pluralistic and messy, yet it is 
apparently the only way that disasters such as Katrina can be anticipated and avoided in 
an increasingly intertwined and fragile world. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Familiar aphorisms aside, hindsight is not necessarily 20/20:  The counterfactual 
nature of the hindsight causation analysis inevitably requires the analyst to create a 
hypothetical world in which alternatives are chosen that were not in fact adopted in the 
real world.  As with the related “cause-in-fact” inquiry in tort law, this inquiry invites a 
great deal of speculation.  When the suggested cause of a catastrophic failure is remote in 
time and when many other actions that are also relevant to the causal analysis intervene 
or could have intervened between the suggested cause and the failure, the opportunity for 
analysts to speculate—or manipulate—becomes very real.  Accordingly, how we sort 
among many uncertain counterfactual worlds to identify responsible causal agents says as 
much about our politics and our culture as it does about our science.184   
 In that respect, recent attempts by politicians and pundits to pin the levee failure 
in New Orleans on NEPA litigation do not speak well of our politics and our culture.  
Hindsight analysis provides little reason to believe that a barrier project of the sort 
envisioned in 1976 would have prevented the Hurricane Katrina storm surge from 
breaching the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals, as recent critics of 
NEPA have argued.  Looking forward, policymakers are well advised to examine what 
exactly caused the levees along the outfall canals to fail, taking action to rebuild or fortify 
those levees prior to investing in an expensive barrier project.  Once that remedial work is 
accomplished, a more expansive barrier project may still be warranted, and it may even 
need to be substantially more protective than the project envisioned in 1976, including a 
seagate at the point at which the MRGO Canal intersects with the Intercoastal Waterway 
to provide equitable levels of protection to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish.185  
Any such project, however, should only be contemplated with the same commitment to 
integrated, environmentally-informed decisionmaking that has characterized NEPA since 
its adoption in 1969. 
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According to some estimates, a coastal protection system capable of guarding 
against a Category Four to Five storm for New Orleans would cost $2.5 billion and 
require 10 to 20 years of construction.186  As hindsight analysis of the LPVHPP planning 
process shows, deciding whether to undertake such a project can never be reduced 
entirely to a technocratic exercise.  Just as judgment and discretion inhere in the 
attribution of fault for a causally overdetermined disaster, so too does the prediction of 
harm from inherently complex and uncertain systems always require the exercise of 
collective agency and responsibility.  To be sure, the tools of risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis do provide vital information for public policymaking.  They must, 
however, be deployed with a degree of sensitivity regarding their limitations and a 
vigilant awareness of the need for moral and political judgments that go beyond the 
parameters of the formalized analytical frameworks. 
The LPVHPP planning process suggests that such sensitivity and awareness may 
have been placed in jeopardy by overzealous confidence in the powers of technical 
decisionmaking apparatuses.187  In the case of the SPH, a sophisticated meteorological 
model tended to obscure important decisions regarding the treatment of highly uncertain 
but potentially catastrophic risks to present and future New Orleans residents, suggesting 
a degree of normative agreement lurking behind the concept of “reasonably 
characteristic” hurricanes that was almost certainly absent in actuality.  In the case of 
cost-benefit analysis, the Corps’ approach to economic project evaluation seemed both to 
stack the deck against long-range investment in disaster prevention and mitigation, and to 
promote a form of “mission creep” in the Corps planning activities toward easily 
monetizable benefits. 
 In sum, neither the blame game nor the numbers game is up to the task of 
formulating sound and ethical natural disaster policy.  Instead, analysts should set out the 
uncertainties of both hindsight and prospective analyses in a way that is easily accessible 
to decisionmakers and the public, so that the full challenge of long-term intergenerational 
risk regulation will be highlighted for consideration, rather than obscured from view.  
Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is 
likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking—whether 
the parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when we are planning a hurricane 
protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sunk New Orleans” when we are 
attempting to allocate responsibility for a disaster some forty years later. 
_______ 
                                                 
186 CRS Report, New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, Sept. 6, 
2005.  These estimates are likely vastly optimistic.  See Peter Whoriskey & Spencer S. Shu, Levee Repair 
Costs Triple, Washington Post, March 31, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR2006033001912.html?nav=rss_email/components (noting that the Bush 
Administration had raised cost estimates for rebuilding the New Orleans levee system to “federal 
standards” to $10 billion in light of better understanding of wetlands loss, subsidence, and hurricane 
frequency and intensity).  
187 Porter, supra note __, at 7-8 (“Quantitative estimates sometimes are given considerable weight 
when nobody defends their validity with real conviction . . .  Quantification is a way of making decisions 
without seeming to decide.  Objectivity lends authority to officials who have little of their own.”).  
